Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium in Submodular Aggregative Games*

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Abstract

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.

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Key Words: Nash equilibrium, global stability, Cournot oligopoly

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