The Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players (Published in *Public Choice*)

Abstract This article proves that if each player’s measure of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing in his or her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the general rent-seeking game where risk-averse players can coexist with risk-neutral players, attitude toward risk can differ among players, and player’s concave production functions for lotteries are not necessarily the same among players.

Key Words Rent seeking • Non-increasing absolute risk aversion • Uniqueness

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