Research Interests
game theory, social choice

Working papers

[4] Complexity consideration on the existence of strategy-proof social choice functions. (2010) PDF (Revised version 2010/07/13)

[3] Maskin monotonic coalition formation rules respecting group rights. (2008) PDF (revised version 2010/01/07)

[2] Consistency and Unanimity in the House Allocation Problem I: Collective Initial Endowments. (2006) PDF (revised version 28 April 2006)

[1] Mutual Knowledge of Rationality in the Electronic Mail Game. (2004) (with Akira Tanaka) PDF

Articles published/to be published

[10] Computational complexity in the design of voting rules. (with Akira Tanaka) PDF
Theory and Decision 80(1) (Jan 2016) pp.33--41, DOI 10.1007/s11238-014-9422-7

[9] Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems. PDF
International Journal of Game Theory 42(1) (Feb 2013) pp.115--130, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x

[8] Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities. PDF
Journal of Mathematical Economics 45(1,2) (Jan 2009) pp.199--204.

[7] Domains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity Are Equivalent. PDF
Economics Letters 95(3) (June 2007) pp.348--54.
The published version contains some typos. I recommend referring to the original manuscript posted here.

[6] On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem. PDF
Economics Bulletin 3(19) (Aug 31, 2006) pp1--8.

[5] The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences: Implementation in Nash Equilibrium. PDF
(with Tomoichi Shinotsuka)
Games and Economic Behavior 44(2) (Aug 2003) pp379-89.
This paper contains some errors. We have corrected them only recently. (2013/06) Corrigendum PDF

[4] On Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores: A Converse Result. PDF
Social Choice and Welfare 20(1) (Jan 2003) pp77-83.

[3] The Consistency Principle and an Axiomatization of the alpha-Core. PDF
International Journal of Game Theory vol 30(2) (Dec 2001) pp195-207.

[2] Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets. PDF
Mathematical Social Sciences vol 41(2)(March 2001) pp201-13.

[1] A Basic Lemma on Social Welfare Functions: Derivation of Arrow's and Sen's Theorems. PDF
Economic Journal of Hokkaido University vol 29(July 2000) pp121-7.